Fair Use and Audiovisual Criticism by O\u27Malley, Brian S.
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 4 | Number 3 Article 3
1-1-1982
Fair Use and Audiovisual Criticism
Brian S. O'Malley
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brian S. O'Malley, Fair Use and Audiovisual Criticism, 4 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 419 (1982).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol4/iss3/3
Fair Use and Audiovisual Criticism
By BRIAN S. O'MALLEY*
I
Introduction
The critic, despised but not ignored, stands between the art-
ist and the audience, much as Saint Peter stands at the gates of
heaven, or Cerberus at the entrance of Hades. Exercising con-
siderable power over the artistic and financial success of the
artist's work and career, the critic's word can ring the artist
into the glory of recognition, or drive him down to the perdition
of obscurity. The critic expresses these opinions in mere
words-as the light of pure reason and analysis, or a quote
from the artist's work.
While the role of the critic has not changed fundamentally
over the years, the art forms critiqued have. Video and film
swim into the ken of the critic, who speaks now not only from
the printed page, but from radio and television. His quotes
from the work, delivered for illustration, come not just as mere
words, but in kind, as excerpts from the audio and visual works
reviewed.
The use of quotations from copyrighted works in criticisms
in order to illustrate the critic's arguments has long been al-
lowed by courts under the doctrine of fair use.' Traditionally,
courts have had in mind literary works,2 or scientific writings,3
and have only recently broached the subject of visual or audio-
visual works. The question arises, then, whether an excerpt
from a film or video work used for purposes of criticism, com-
* Member, Third Year Class. B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1975. A
version of this note has been entered into the Nathan Burkan Memorial competition.
1. An early case is Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.
4,901). The fair use provision of the Copyright Act of 1976 also permits fair use in such
areas as "news reporting, teaching, (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research..." 17 U.S.C. app. § 107 (1976). See notes 17-34 and accompa-
nying text, infra.
2. 9 F. Cas. at 344.
3. Farmer v. Elstner, 33 F. 494, 496 (E.D. Mich. 1888).
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ment or review should be treated like an excerpt from a writ..
ten work similarly used.
Two recent decisions, Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broad-
casting System,4 and Iowa State University v. American
Broadcasting and ABC Sports, Inc.,5 have found infringement
in the use of film clips from copyrighted films. Defenses of fair
use were denied in both cases. The court in Iowa State re-
jected the fair use defense, implicitly saying that ABC's use of
the plaintiff's film amounted to "corporate theft,"6 and that
ABC's bad faith conduct was "not irrelevant to the fairness of
its use."7 The court in Roy Export cited this reasoning and de-
nied CBS's motion to find fair use as a matter of law." Neither
court dealt with the question of whether either use might be
considered criticism or review, or whether any use of audiovi-
sual materials might be considered fair use for that purpose.
This note will examine the nature of fair use, focusing on fair
use for the purposes of criticism, comment and review.9 The
note will look at the kinds of criticism allowed under the doc-
trine of fair use, the nature of criticism itself, and will propose
a method of analyzing fair use in critical works. After examin-
ing the problems of fair use of visual and audiovisual works,
the note will examine the decisions in Iowa State and Roy Ex-
port and discuss the effect they might have on the fair use of
audiovisual materials.
II
Copyright and Fair Use
A. Copyright Law
The first English copyright law was enacted in 170910 and
gave authors the exclusive right to copy and publish their
works. In 1785, Lord Mansfield spoke of the application of the
Act:
we must take care to guard against two extremes equally prej-
4. 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
5. 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
6. Id. at 61.
7. Id. at 62.
8. 503 F. Supp. at 1147. The court also said that in addition to "the four factors,"
see note 17, infra, a jury could also find "that CBS's use of the copyrighted material
was in bad faith." Id. at 1146. See notes 108-13 and accompanying text, infra.
9. See note 37, in/ra.
10. 8 Anne, c.19 (1709).
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udicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their
time for the service of the community, may not be deprived of
their just merits, and the reward of their Ingenuity and Labour;
the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements,
nor the progress of the arts be retarded."n
United States copyright law has these same goals. Article I,
section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power
"[tJo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... ,,12
The current American copyright statute, the Copyright Act of
1976,1 has expanded "works of authorship" to include literary
works, musical works, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,
audiovisual works and sound recordings. 4 The Act grants the
creator a collection of rights in the copyrighted work,'" but also
enumerates a number of limitations on and exceptions to those
rights.'6 In this way, the Act avoids the extremes spoken of by
Lord Mansfield: it protects the creator's investment by reserv-
ing certain exclusive rights, and promotes "the progress of the
arts" by allowing others specific and limited rights to use the
work.
B. Fair Use
One of the exceptions to the rights of the creator is the doc-
trine of fair use, codified at section 107 of the Copyright Act.' 7
11. Sayre v. Moore, 1 East, 361, 102 Eng. Rep. 139, n.140 (K.B. 1785).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (J. Madison), says that the Fed-
eral Government can best deal with the matter, and that "Ithe copyright of authors
has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common law."
13. 17 U.S.C. app. (1976).
14. 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(a) (1976).
15. "(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work...; (2) to prepare derivative works
; (3) to distribute copies.. .; (4) to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and (5)
to display the copyrighted work publicly." 17 U.S.C. app. § 106 (1976).
16. Sections 107-12 place general limitations on exclusive rights: fair use (§ 107);
reproduction by libraries and archives (§ 108); the effect of a transfer of a particular
copy or phonorecord (§ 109); exemption of certain performances and displays (§ 110);
secondary transmissions (§ 111); and ephemeral recordings (§ 112). Sections 113-18
limit the scope of particular exclusive rights: Pictorial, graphic and sculptural works
(§ 113); sound recordings (§ 114); compulsory license for making and distributing pho-
norecords (§ 115); coin-operated phonorecord players (§ 116); use in conjunction with
computers and similar information systems (§ 117); and use of certain works in con-
nection with noncommercial broadcasting (§ 118).
17. Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106,.. . the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
No. 31
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Fair use has been called "the most troublesome [issue] in all
copyright law"18 and "so flexible as virtually to defy defini-
tion."19 The purpose of section 107 is to allow a defense to in-
fringement when the copying, in the view of the court, is fair
under the circumstances.20 Stated another way, the fair use
doctrine "permits a copyrighted work to be used without au-
thorization in various ways and, among other things, allows the
taking, appropriation, or use of a certain amount of material
from a copyrighted work under certain circumstances. 21
Copying that courts in the past have found to be fair use in-
cludes use in areas suggested by the language of section 107:
"criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including mul-
tiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research
t922
It is important to remember that fair use is not limited to,
these categories, nor is copying that falls in one of the enumer-
ated categories automatically fair use.23 The use must always
be considered in light of the four factors set out in section 107::
(1) the purpose and character of use; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount of use; and (4) the effect of
the use upon the potential market value.24 These factors were
derived from cases dealing with the question of fair use, and
this section was intended to restate the law, "not to change,
narrow, or enlarge it in any way. ' 25 It is also to be emphasized
that the four factors do not define fair use; they are simply fac-
other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors
to be considered shall include-(1) the purpose and character of use, includ-
ing whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substan-
tiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
18. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
19. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130, 130-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
20. Register's 1961 Report at 24. See also Annot., 23 A.LR 3d 139, 156-68 (1969) for a
discussion of federal courts' jurisdiction and handling of fair use.
21. Annot., 23 A.L.R. 3d 139, 164 (1969).
22. 17 U.S.C. app. § 107 (1976). See note 17, supra.
23. N. BooRsTYN, COPYRIGHT LAw, § 5:2, at 119 (1982).
24. 17 U.S.C. app. § 107 (1976). See note 17, supra.
25. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HousE
REPORT].
[Vol. 4
FAIR USE AND AUDIOVISUAL CRITICISM
tors to be considered.2 6 Other factors can be and have been
considered.27 Fair use is determined using case-by-case 28 anal-
ysis based on an examination of all the evidence 29 and the cir-
cumstances30 of the case. In short, the court is left with great
discretion in determining whether the use is fair in a given
situation. 1
Despite the equitable nature of the fair use defense, it is gen-
erally considered a question of fact for the jury.12 The court in
Lawrence v. Dana33 viewed it as a mixed question of law
(whether the use was allowable or infringing), and fact (what
use the defendant made of the copyrighted work).3
III
Criticism and Fair Use
Courts have long recognized as fair use the copying of writ-
ten works for the purposes of criticism and review. This recog-
nition has largely been for illustrative purposes,35 as only a few
courts have had the issue of fair use and criticism directly
before them.36 The best explanation for the courts' indulgence
26. 17 U.S.C. app. § 107 (1976). "[T]he endless variety of situations and combina-
tions of circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of
exact rules in the statute." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 25, at 66.
27. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 13.05[A], at 13-56 to 13-57 (1980). See also
Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, in COPYRIGHT AND RELATED Topics 115
(1981): the intent with which the use is made; amount of user's labor involved, benefit
gained by user, value of material used; Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp.
130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) and Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d
303, 309 (2d Cir. 1966): public interest. It should be noted that the holding in Time, Inc.
v. Bernard Geis Assoc. has rarely been followed. The court in Iowa State called the
circumstances of Time an "almost unique experience," and believed that "such situa-
tions are rare." 651 F.2d at 61 n.6.
28. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 25, at 66.
29. Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943); N.Y.
Trib. v. Otis & Co., 39 F. Supp. 67 (D.C.N.Y. 1941).
30. Karl v. Curtis Pub. Co., 39 F. Supp. 836, 837 (D.C. Wis. 1941).
31. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 13.05[A], at 13-57.
32. Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943); Eisen-
schiml v. Fawcett Publications Inc., 246 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 907 (1957).
33. 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136).
34. Id. at 56. For the purposes of summary judgment, however, if the facts are not
in dispute, fair use can pose a question of law. Meeropol v. Nizer, 417 F. Supp. 1201,
1213 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd in part, rev'd in part, 560 F.2d 1061, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978); Higgins v. Baker, 309 F. Supp. 635, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
35. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); Farmer v. Elstner, 33
F. 494, 496 (E.D. Mich. 1888).
36. In Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 131 F. Supp., 165, 175
No. 31
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towards critics and commentators is that criticism does not ful-
fill the same function as the work reviewed 37 -it supplements.,
but it does not supplant.38
There is no "legal" definition of criticism 3 as it applies to
copyright that might indicate when fair use should apply. The
Eleventh Edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica reflects the
traditional view of criticism as a scholastic discipline when it
defines criticism as "the art of judging the qualities and values
of an aesthetic object, whether in literature or the fine arts. '40
The fine arts can be broken down into art, drama, literature,
and music. 41
Yet any copyrighted work can be the subject of criticism, and
if any part of it can be used in that criticism, it could come
under the aegis of fair use. Even the most transitory art forms,
e.g. pantomime, could be copied in some manner (videotape,
film, photographs) for use in a forum (e.g. television) wherein
they could be criticized. In addition, the sciences, when em-
bodied in a book, paper or other copyrightable form, can be the
subject of criticism.'
A. Forms of Criticism
Criticism relevant to a discussion of fair use can be broken
down into four general areas: reviews, scholarly criticism, crit-
icism in response to criticism, and parody.
Reviews generally involve single works of art, drama, cinema
(S.D. Cal. 1955), affd, 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), afrd per curiam, 356 U.S. 43, rehear-
ing denied, 356 U.S. 934 (1958). The court dealt with the issue of parody as criticism
and referred to the right of critics to quote extensively for purposes of illustration and
criticism. See also the discussion on parody, notes 48-55 and accompanying text, infra.
See also the discussion and cases relating to response to criticism, notes 45-47 and
accompanying text, infra.
37. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 13.05[B], at 13-65.
38. Id. at 13-66. "Indeed, such quotations in the form of criticisms are frequently of
great value to the author himself, and may actually increase the sale of his book."
Farmer v. Elstner, 33 F. at 496.
39. The legal significance of the terms "review", "comment" and "criticism" appear
to be equivalent.
40. 7 Encyclopaedia Britannica 468 (11th ed. 1910).
41. 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 220-224 (1970).
42. What should be distinguished here is the use of a scientific work for further
research in the same field. Such use may be considered fair in the interests of the
progress of science and the useful arts. It cannot be considered criticism, and is not
within the scope of this article. See West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169
F. 833, 866 (E.D.N.Y. 1909). See also Yankwich, What is Fair Use?, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 203,
209 n.28 (1954).
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or literature. They appear in magazines and newspapers, and
deal almost exclusively with recently published or released
works. This type of criticism can hardly be said to fulfill the
same function as the work reviewed. In fact, it serves the quite
different and valuable function of bringing the creator's work
to the public's attention.43
Scholarly works of criticism are more considered works, gen-
erally dealing with less current matters, covering broader ar-
eas and often dealing with more than one work. Published as
books, monographs or as articles in scholarly journals, such
criticism might deal with some aspects of a writer's works, a
school of painting, or trends and theories in one of the social
sciences. The difficulty in ascertaining fair use for reviews and
scholarly works is that while courts have repeatedly given
their approval of these types of criticism, there have been no
decisions that determine the limits of the use such criticism
can make of the criticized work.44
The third category is criticism in response to criticism. Sec-
tion 107 does not specifically mention the fair use of excerpts
from a critical or derogatory work when used in a different
work written in response to criticism. However, the House Re-
port accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976 would permit re-
production of those parts "necessary to permit understandable
comment" on a work containing "unfair, inaccurate, or deroga-
tory information. '4 In Consumers Union of the United States,
Inc. v. Hobart Mfg. Co.,4 the defendant, a dishwasher manu-
facturer, reprinted statements from the plaintiffs copyrighted
magazine article in the defendant's sales bulletin, criticizing
the plaintiff's testing of its product. The court held that the
plaintiff could not, by copyrighting its unfavorable remarks in
its magazine article, prevent the defendant from repeating
those remarks and refuting them.47
43. Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, in COPYRIGHT AND RELATED Topics
116 (1964).
44. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, Study No. 14 19 (1958), prepared for
the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
45. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 25, at 73.
46. 180 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
47. Fair use was denied in a similar case, Amana Refrigeration v. Consumers
Union of U.S., 431 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Iowa 1977), because the defendant's brochure,
which quoted from the consumer magazine article, contained no criticism of the article
or the consumer magazine.
No. 3]
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Parody and burlesque 8 are humorous works which derive
their humor from imitating and mocking other, usually serious
works.49 In Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., the court stated that
"[a] copyrighted work is subject to fair criticism, serious or hu-
morous."' 0 More recently, the court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Productions,51 agreed: "[t]he un-
derlying rationale for applying the 'fair use' doctrine to parody
and satire is that these art forms involve the type of original
critical comment meant to be protected by section 107 of the
Copyright Act of 1976. ' ' 2l
One case that has taken the opposite view is Benny v. Loew'i
Inc.,5 3 which rejected a defense of burlesque as "literary criti-
cism." In holding that "a 30-minute television burlesque of a
copyrighted play was a Substantial taking 4 and too excessive
for fair use, the court said hat calling burlesque "criticism" in
hopes of invoking the doctrine of fair use is "parody upon the
meaning of criticism.' 5
B. Criticism and the Four Factors
The use of a copyrighted work in criticism or comment does
not mean that the use is ipso facto fair.56 The four factors of
section 107 have to be applied to the circumstances of the case.
While use in a work of criticism may on its face appear to be
justified, another factor may shift the equity in favor of deny-
ing fair use. These factors are closely interrelated. 7
48. These terms are often used interchangeably, but have been given technically
different meanings. See Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33
CAN. B. REV. 1130; Light, Parody, Burlesque, and the Economic Rationale for Copy-
right, 11 CoN. L. REV. 615, 616 n.6. One writer has distinguished burlesque from par-
ody in that the element of criticism is absent from the former, leaving humor as the
sole object. Study No. 14, supra note 44, at 9.
49. Light, supra note 48, at 616.
50. 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914) (emphasis added).
51. 479 F. Supp. 351 (D.C. Ga. 1979).
52. Id. at 357.
53. 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), affd, 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affid per
curiam, 356 U.S. 43, rehearing denied, 356 U.S. 934 (1958).
54. In order to state a cause of action for infringement, the copyright owner must
establish that the defendant copied his work. Since proof of the act of copying is
nearly impossible, the owner need only prove that the defendant had access to the
allegedly copied work, and that the works are substantially similar. Some courts refer
to this last requirement as substantial taking. See 3 M. NimMER, supra note 27, at 13-.5
to 13-9.
55. 239 F.2d at 537.
56. See note 23 and accompanying text, supra.
57. See notes 79-86 and accompanying text, inifra.
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The following is an outline of the fair use factors as they re-
late to fair use for critical purposes.
1. Purpose and Character of Use
The purpose of the use is obviously criticism, but the charac-
ter of the use must also be examined. Section 107(1) suggests
as one characteristic "whether such use is of a commercial na-
ture or is for nonprofit educational purposes ... ."I Use for
nonprofit purposes will not in and of itself make the use fair,59
nor does commercial use preclude a finding of fair use,60 al-
though it "tends to cut against a fair use defense. ' 61 Related to
the profit/nonprofit aspect is whether the use is for scholarship
or research. Such use has been held to enlarge the scope of
what may be used.62 A popularized account, however, will not
deny fair use.63 No one aspect of use will determine if that use
is justified. 4
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
Printed material presents few problems for the critic wishing
to quote a portion of a work. The only consideration is whether
the amount used is excessive. The nature of the visual and au-
diovisual arts, on the other hand, present peculiar problems for
the application of the fair use doctrine.6
3. The Amount of Use
One of the most troublesome aspects of fair use in criticism
is the extent of the quotation or excerpt that is allowed. The
concession made by publishers in the beginnings of books-
that no more than 300 words may be used in the form of brief
quotations for critical articles or reviews-has been held not to
be dispositive on the question of fair use.66 The copying can-
58. 17 U.S.C. app. § 107(1) (1976).
59. See Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243 (D.C.N.Y.
1978).
60. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 1009.
61. Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th
Cir. 1980).
62. Loew's, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 175 (S.D. Cal. 1955); aff'd, 239 F.2d 532
(9th Cir. 1956), af'd per curiam, 356 U.S. 43, rehearing denied, 356 U.S. 934 (1958).
63. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013.
64. See note 23 and accompanying text, infra.
65. See notes 81-100 and accompanying text, infra.
66. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d at 1061.
No. 31
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not, however, be so extensive that the criticism becomes a sub-
stitute for the original: "Sufficient may be taken to give a
correct view of the whole; but the privilege of making extracts
is limited to those objects, and cannot be exercised to such an
extent that the review shall become a substitute for the book
reviewed."67 The two extremes that Lord Mansfield spoke of68
can be paraphrased as they apply to criticism: Criticism
should not be severely limited by prohibiting the use of exam-
ples for illustration, but neither should critics be given free
rein to exploit or supplant copyrighted works.69
One example of a supplanted copyrighted work occurred in
Robert Stigwood Group v. O'Reilly. 0 The defendants were a
group of priests who performed without permission the musi-
cal Jesus Christ Superstar, changing some of the words and
parts of the plot to align the musical with their religious be-
liefs. They were sued for infringement, and their defense was
that their version was a "literary and religious criticism" of the
plaintiffs' work. The court rejected the defense, noting that
while a critical review with extensive quotes can be made in
order to comment effectively, the defendant could not copy
practically verbatim, with a few variations to make a "better"
version.7 '
Not all "quoting" need be so extensive to be unfair use. Jus-
tice Story, in what was the first American case to deal with the
doctrine of fair use,7 2 recognized that the quality of the excerpt
was as important as the quantity. "[W]e must often, in decid-
ing questions of this sort, look to the nature and objects of the
selections made, the quantity and vale of the materials used
.... "7" The court in Roy Export acknowledged the impor-
tance of the "quality" or "value" of the excerpt used in deter-
67. Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136).
68. See note 11 and accompanying text, supra.
69. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); Lawrence v.
Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 61 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136).
70. 346 F. Supp. 376 (D.C. Conn. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 530 F.2d 1096, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 848.
71. Id. at 385. See also Warner Bros. v. ABC, Inc., 654 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1981). The
plaintiff there owned the rights to the comic book character Superman and sued the
defendant whose television character "Hero" was allegedly substantially similar to Su-
perman. The court upheld the lower court's finding of no substantial similarity but
questioned whether a parody defense could "shield an entire work that is substantially
similar to and in competition with the copyrighted work." Id. at 211.
72. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
73. Id. at 348.
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mining fair use, as it applies to the use of film segments.
"[TJhere would be a substantial taking of 'Gone With the
Wind' if somebody just took the burning of Atlanta ... ten or
fifteen minutes of a three or four hour movie. ' 74
4. Effect Upon the Potential Market
Aside from a situation where so much of the plaintiff's work
is used that the defendant's critical work has supplanted it, the
effect upon the potential market for or value of the criticized
work is not an important consideration in analyzing fair use for
critical purposes. The effect upon the potential market of an
adversely criticized work, to the extent that it discourages po-
tential purchasers of a book or viewers of a film, is not a factor
in denying fair use .7 To allow such a consideration would de-
ter all criticism.
C. Nature of Criticism
There is often a fine line between use that is proper for criti-
cism, and use that amounts to exploitation. Even if courts
have free rein to make a decision on fair use based on the cir-
cumstances of each case, consistency when dealing with criti-
cism is essential. The critic (as well as the owner of the forum
in which the critic speaks) needs a standard by which to ap-
praise his use of the copyrighted work, lest fear of invoking in-
fringement actions inhibits any criticism.
What is proposed here is an analysis of criticism that will
help critics and courts draw the line between criticism and ex-
ploitation. Essential to this analysis is ascertaining the exact
subject of the criticism. Does the criticism focus on the work
reviewed, or upon the subject of that work? Does the criticism
examine the expression of the idea or the idea itself? It is a
maxim of copyright law that expression (the work) can be
copyrighted, but the idea expressed (the subject of the work)
cannot. 76 This can provide a practical distinction upon which
to base a finding of fair use. For example, consider a film made
of a Shakespeare play, for which of course, the film maker did
not create the dialogue or the plot. If a televised review of the
film containing fim clips focuses on the film itself and dis-
74. 503 F. Supp. at 1145, citing transcript at 774.
75. See Yankwich, supra note 42, at 208.
76. 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(b) (1976). For a discussion of the idea-expression dichot-
omy, see 3 M. NMMnER, supra note 27, § 13.03 [A] [11, at 13-77 to 13-30.
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cusses the director's ability to interpret Shakespeare or the
cinematographer's talents, it has focused on the work re-
viewed, which is the copyrighted expression. If, on the other
hand, the Shakespeare play itself is the subject of a televised
commentary, and the film is merely used as part of the com-
mentary, then the subject of the commentary would also be the
subject of the film.
If the film and the script are by the same creator, the dia-
logue and plot then become part of the expression. The sub-
ject of the film is then simply whatever cannot be copyrighted.
Typically this is some general idea used in the film which is not
original with the film's creator, and therefore not copyright-
able. In a war movie, for instance, neither the battle of Gettys-
burg nor the historic events surrounding it can be
copyrighted.77 The makers of a western cannot corner the con-
cept of the Old West or a gunfight simply by filming a story
using these elements and copyrighting it. If a televised review
had as its subject the Old West or the battle of Gettysburg, it
would have the same subject as the subject of the film. If, how-
ever, the review had as its subject the cinematic treatment of
the Civil War or violence in the movies, the subject of the re-
view would be the expression in the films.
Once the true subject of the criticism has been determined, a
better judgment can be made as to whether fair use was made
of the work criticized. If the work's expression is being ex-
amined, more latitude should be allowed to what is considered
fair use. This is because the true function of criticism is being
realized-the analysis of the abilities of the creator. If on the
other hand, the subject of the criticism is also the subject of the
work being criticized, less latitude should be allowed. There is
in this case greater danger of the work being used, not for an
analysis of that work, but for that work's original purpose and
intrinsic value.
Returning to the example of the Shakespeare film, the func-
tion of the critic is realized when the expression of the film-
maker is examined. Here the critic is doing his true creative
work-analyzing and assessing the abilities and creative prod..
uct of the filmmaker. On the other hand, if the critic has as his
subject Shakespeare, or the particular play, the same subject
as the filmmaker, he is exploiting the filmmaker's work for his
77. Hoehling v. Universal Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir. 1980).
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own purposes. His function as critic may be realized with re-
gard to Shakespeare, but it is not realized with regard to the
film. Having the same subject as a work, the critic cannot use
that work unless his purpose is to criticize that work. 8
This analysis can be illustrated by looking at two cases; one
which deals with parody and the other with response to criti-
cism. In MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,79 the defendants included in
their musical what they alleged was a parody of the plaintiffs
song. One of the defendants admitted, however, that the song
they had written was intended to be a burlesque not of the
plaintiff's song but of "the [19]40's and World War II activity,"
also the subject of the plaintiff's song. The court held that this
was not fair use. In terms of the "subject of criticism" analysis,
since the expression-the words and music of the song-was
not the subject of the parody, it could not be used fairly in a
parody of its subject.
In Amana Refrigeration v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc.,
the court80 ruled on a case involving alleged comment upon
criticism. A 1968 article in Consumer Report magazine favora-
bly reviewed a product of the Amana Company, but a 1973 arti-
cle contained an unfavorable review. A brochure published by
Amana in response to the 1973 article quoted a paragraph from
the 1968 article, but made no mention of the 1973 review. The
court rejected the defense of fair use, finding that the Amana
brochure contained no comment or criticism of either Con-
sumer Report article. Here, as in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, the al-
leged criticism had the same subject as the work criticized: the
favorable aspects of the Amana product. The Amana brochure
also performed the same function as the 1968 article which it
quoted: to praise the Amana products. Accordingly, because
the two works served similar purposes, little latitude was given
to the claim of fair use.
78. It is important to keep in mind that this analysis of criticism involves only the
first of the four factors listed in § 107, purpose and character of use. As will be seen in
the subsequent analysis of cases, the other factors, particularly amount and substanti-
ality of use, play important parts in the determination of fair use.
79. 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 166 (D.C.N.Y. 1976).




Nature of the Copyrighted Work-
The Visual Arts
The fair use of the visual arts for purposes of criticism is
largely an untested field, and there are few cases that have any
precedential value. The Copyright Act protects many forms of
visual art--dramatic works, pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works, pantomimes, choreographic works, motion pictures and
audiovisual works.81 The section on fair use, however, makes
no special mention of the treatment of visual works. The
House Report concerns itself mainly with new technology and
its methods of copying the entire copyrighted work: off-air tap-
ing for home, educational and archival use,82 and classroom
and library copying.83 Copying for home use and for archival
purposes has little in common with fair use of the excerpts in
the criticism. However, such copying may be important to the
critic who must obtain a copy of the work to excerpt for the
purpose of criticism.84 While copying for the classroom may
well involve copying the entire work and may also involve
some criticism, the distribution is limited, and the copying is
for a protected public purpose.85
A. The Single Visual Image
Single visual images, such as photographs, movie stills, and
sculpture, are by virtue of their brevity and "wholeness" easier
to exploit. The single visual image must be viewed in its en-
tirety to be analyzed at all. There is no way to use an "excerpt"
as one can with other types of criticism.86
One writer has explained this need for "wholeness" in terms
of subject and expression: in a writing, "the subject and its
fixed form of expression are already at one symbolic remove
from each other. A photograph is closer to its subject-its
transformation ... relates it directly to the physical subject it
represents."8 7 The difficulty this creates for fair use in criti-
81. 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(a), at 3-6 (1976).
82. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 25, at 73.
83. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 25, at 68, 69.
84. See note 98, infra.
85. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 25, at 66-70.
86. Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for the Electronic as Well as the
Gutenberg Age, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 193, 219 (1980).
87. Timberg, New Forms of Media and the Challenge to Copyright Law, in FAro
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cism of visual materials is that the critic must expropriate the
entire subject of the work to provide an example of the criti-
cized work. Whether it is his intent to comment on that sub-
ject is irrelevant-by taking the image in its entirety he has in
effect made its subject his subject as well.
Nonetheless, cases dealing with single visual images have al-
lowed fair use of the images. Without discussing the problems
inherent in copyrighted visual material, the court in Triangle
Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers88 permitted the fair
use of a magazine cover in a competitor's ad because of de
minimis harm to the plaintiff's copyright. The court's analysis
of the fourth factor listed in section 107, the effect on potential
market value, was dispositive. In Bruzzone v. Miller Brewing
Co ,89 a market researcher used five or six isolated frames from
television commercials to create "photoboards" which he sent
out with questionnaires to perform his research. In finding fair
use, the court not only acknowledged that the negative effect
on the advertisement's market value was minimal, but also
that the marketing researcher's use of the commercials was for
the purpose of "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, and research."9 °
Fair use in visual copying was disallowed, however, in Walt
Disney Productions v. Air Pirates.91 The court held that the
defendants' use of the plaintiff's cartoon characters, in situa-
tions which contrasted with their innocent images, involved
more taking than was necessary to recall or conjure up the
original92 for the purposes of parody. Here, the third factor,
amount and substantiality of use, played a major part in the
court's decision. The court also dealt with the purpose and
character of the use, pointing out that "the essence of this par-
ody did not focus on how the characters looked, but rather par-
odied their personalities, their wholesomeness and their
innocence."93 This distinction is important. Had the drawings
USE AND FREE INQUIRY COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE NEW MEDIA 253 (J. Lawrence & B.
Timberg eds. 1980) (footnotes omitted).
88. 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
89. 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 809 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
90. Id. at 811.
91. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
92. The "recall or conjure up" standard was derived from Berlin v. E.C. Comics,
329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964). The defendant in Air Pirates argued that extensive copying
was necessary for the "best parody", but the court balanced the need for "best parody"
against the rights of the copyright owner.
93. 581 F.2d at 758 (footnote omitted).
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of the Disney characters alone been the subject of the parody,
this expression clearly would have been available for fair use.
Since the defendants were attacking the underlying idea of
wholesomeness, they were less free to use the characters. 4 To
express this in terms of the "subject of the criticism" analysis,
the subject of the defendant's parody was not just the visual
image of the comic characters, but the idea which the charac-
ters were originally created to portray: wholesomeness and in-
nocence. The characters' personalities were the subject of the
plaintiff's original work, and they were also the subject of the
defendant's parody, so a fair use defense would have had even
less merit.
B. Audiovisual Works
Audiovisual works are defined by the Copyright Act as con-
sisting of
"a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to
be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as projectors,
viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying
sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects,
such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied."95
No reported case has yet extended the doctrine of fair use to
comment and criticism of audiovisual works. The House Re..
port, however, suggests that the fair use doctrine should ex-
tend to educational broadcasters, although narrowly
94. The court said that "a cartoon character's image is intertwined with its person..
ality and other traits," 581 F.2d at 757, which raises the question of whether copying a
cartoon character's visual image is necessary for a critique of its personality or the
cartoon's story line. This issue was dealt with in another controversy involving Walt
Disney, related in Lawrence, Donald Duck v. Chilean Socialism: A Fair Use Exchange
in FAIR USE AND FREE INQUiRY. A number of book sellers attempted to import copies of
an English language translation of a book critical of the Disney comic books published
in Chile. The critique (A. DORFMAN & A. MATTELART, How TO READ DONALD DUCK:
IMPERIALISTIC IDEOLOGY IN THE DISNEY COMIC (D. Kunzle trans. 1975)) used frames
and characters from the comic books. The shipment was seized by Customs, pending a
decision on infringement by the Treasury department. The authors argued that
cartoons involved an "inseparable marriage of literary and visual matter," and visual
images were necessary to illustrate "the incredible use of racial, ethnic, professional,
political slurs and stereotypes which are the very essence of Disney graphic matter."
(Letter from A. Dorfman, A. Mattelhart, and S. Siegelaub to Custom Compliance enti-
tled 6 Reasons Why No Cartoon Matter, No Book, (Aug. 12, 1975). The Department
ruled that the use of the cartoon frames did "not appear to be a substantial appropria-
tion of a material part of any one copyrighted work .... " (Letter from Eleanor M.
Suske, Chief of Imports Compliance, to Peter Weiss, Center for Constitutional Rights
(June 9, 1976).
95. 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976).
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circumscribed: "under appropriate circumstances it could ap-
ply to the nonsequential showing of an individual still or slide,
or to the performance of a short motion picture for criticism or
comment."96
How short must such a fair use be? It has been argued both
that an arbitrary time limit should be placed on excerpts from
audiovisual works, and that fair use excerption is inapplicable
to audiovisual works.9
7
The latter view is not difficult to understand. The climax or
high adventure scenes from a move has marketability, even
when removed from the context of the entire movie. Broad-
casting or screening such scenes would certainly have an ad-
verse .effect on that movie's marketability.
9 8
96. HousE REPORT, supra note 25, at 72.
97. See Timberg, New Forms of Media and the Challenge to Copyright Law, in
FAIm USE AND FREE INQUIRY-COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE NEW MEDIA 254 (J. Lawrence &
B. Timberg eds. 1980).
98. See note 75 and accompanying text, supra.
The problem of obtaining a work in order to excerpt it differs greatly for the literary
and the audiovisual critic. The literary critic simply buys (or is sent) a copy of the
work, and copies out the appropriate passages. The audiovisual critic can always view
the film, but may have difficulty obtaining a copy of the fim or video work from which
to take the clip necessary for his criticism. Many audiovisual works can be purchased,
but the selection of first-run movies, older and lesser-known works, and almost all tele-
vision shows is very limited.
One video mail order catalogue, Video Preview Magazine (1981), available through
Video City Mail Order Co., Lafayette, Ca., listed over 2000 videotape and video-disk
selections including movies, concerts, sporting events, and television shows. However,
none of the current and only a handful of the previous year's Academy Award nomi-
nees were listed.
A critic may be able to obtain footage free of charge from the producer, much as a
book critic gets free copies from the publisher. Both the publisher and the producer
have promotion in mind when they offer their product, but there the similarity ends.
The producer generally does not offer the entire product but only selected shorts. In
one such arrangement between a movie producer and the producer of a television
"magazine"-type show, agreement between Warner Bros. and Videowest Productions,
February 4, 1981, the movie producer licensed the use of pre-selected excerpts from a
movie then being released. Airtime was limited by agreement not to exceed Screen
Actor Guild limitations, of no more than two minutes and thirteen seconds of any one
scene, and no more than four minutes and twenty-six seconds of two or more scenes.
The diffIculty with this arrangement is obvious. Not only can the movie producer
select the portions that the critic must work with, thus limiting the freedom and effec-
tiveness of the critic, he can also deprive a possibly unfriendly critic of any access to
the movie. Furthermore, limitations on length, whether set by the producer or the
Screen Actors Guild, are highly artificial as applied to the critic.
Another way for the critic to obtain audiovisual material is to copy it himself, either
off television or from material obtained from archives or commercial rental. To do so,
however, can subject the critic/copier to another infringement charge. In Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that off-the-air copying of copyrighted materials in one's
COMM/ENT
The most likely medium for the fair use of audiovisual
materials is television, which can accomodate frequent reviews
of movies and television programs, and can provide a broader
audience more quickly than movies or documentaries, which
require more involved distribution. In addition, with the pros-
pect of community involvement in cable television,99 television
is also the most accessible medium for critics.
Television-based criticism is likely to be one of two sorts: the
review of newly released films and television shows, and re-
trospectives of a director's or actor's works, or a genre. A re-
view of a recently released film has as its subject the film, and
every aspect of the film's art: the acting, camera angles and so
forth. The subject of the film reviewed--cowboy and indian
wars, a star-crossed romance-would not be the subject of the
review. The subject of the film is of little interest to a viewer of
the review, who is looking for an evening's entertainment, or
enjoying a critic's wit.
The maker of a retrospective walks a finer line. With a less
clear-cut purpose than a reviewer of current films, he risks ex-
ploiting the films he examines. For example, a retrospective of
horror films could easily adopt the subject of the films ana-
lyzed-frightening its audience-in addition to its rightful sub-
ject of the films' art.
Some of a movie's vulnerability to excerption comes from its
visual properties-the subject and its expression are united in
the visual image. Yet there is an element present in an audio-
visual work that is not present in the single visual image--the
own home for private non-commercial use constituted infringement. Id. at 969. The
court also declined to call this kind of use fair. Id. at 971. As for non-off-the-air copy-
ing, the court held that the legislative history applicable to sound recording granting a
home-recording exemption did not apply to audiovisual recording. Id. at 968. Conse-
quently, if a critic makes a copy of a ifim or television show in order to formulate his
criticism, his doing so would constitute infringement.
If, however, the critic passes the first barrier and has legitimately obtained a copy
from which to take excerpts for his criticism, it is clear that the decision in Universal
City Studios does not make him an infringer for using those excerpts in his criticism.
In discussing the types of exclusions covered by the fair use doctrine, the court distin-
guished the wholesale copying of audiovisual materials from other types of use by fo-
cusing on the frst sentence of § 107, where use in criticism is listed as an area where
fair use can be applied: "fair use has traditionally involved what might be termed the
'productive use' of copyrighted material .... It is noteworthy that the statute does
not list 'convenience' or 'entertainment' or 'increased access' as purposes within the
general scope of fair use." Id. at 970.
99. See Meyerson, The First Amendment and the Cable Television Operator: An
Unprotective Shield Against Public Access Requirements, 4 COMM/ENr LJ. 1 (1981).
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element of time. The length of movies makes possible the de-
velopment of other subjects not directly linked to the visual
image. For instance, story line, character development, and
other characteristics which are fundamental to the novel and
which can be the subject of any book review can also be funda-
mental to the audiovisual work. When an excerpt is used from
a movie, the entire work is not expropriated; only a fraction. A
movie is too long for a criticism to expropriate all of it, just as a
book review cannot reprint the entire book. The single visual
image, on the other hand, can be encompassed in an instant by
modern audiovisual methods.
Because of the time element, less damage is done to the mar-
ket value of a two-hour film by the use of only a few minutes in
a commentary or criticism than is done to a single image by
any kind of copying. For the purpose of fair use, excerption
from film or video is more analogous to excerption from a book
than it is to the use of a single visual image.100
It follows that if film and video critics are to enjoy the same
freedom and stature as literary critics, they should have simi-
lar legal rights in the use of the artistic work. Criticism,
whether of the great American novel or of a Hollywood pre-
view, is necessary to inform the public of the artistic merits
and entertainment value of any work. Fair use, by allowing il-
lustration to supplement analysis, serves an essential part in
criticism and should not be denied the audiovisual critic.
V
Roy Export and Iowa State
Substantial case law does not exist dealing with the fair use
of audiovisual material. The litigious attitude taken by media
corporations with property to protect has discouraged the fair
use of films and television programs. 10 1 Two recent cases have
100. The 'element of time' concept is not necessarily limited to audiovisual works.
Comic books, while joining the subject and expression of the artist in the individual
panel, have story lines and character developments that extend for several pages. The
analogy made in this article between films and literary works could also be made be-
tween comic books and literary works. In Walt Disney v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th
Cir. 1978), the court rejected the defense of fair use because the defendant took more
than was necessary to "conjure up" the plaintiff's comic book characters for the pur-
pose of parody. Id. at 758. If excerpts of one of the plaintiff's comic book stories were
used in a critique of the comic book, such as its story or its characters, the court may
well have allowed a fair use defense. See note 94, supra.
101. "Willingness [of media corporations] to litigate, in conjunction with some
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dealt with the fair use of film-Roy Export v. Columbia Broad-
casting System' 2 and Iowa State Univ. v. American Broadcast-
ing and ABC Sports, Inc., ° 3- with large media corporations
raising the defense of fair use.
A. The Cases and Findings
1. Roy Export
CBS put together a retrospective of Charlie Chaplin com-
prising excerpts from several of his films. Some of the films
were in the public domain, and the rights to others were owned
by the plaintiffs. When CBS asked the plaintiffs for permission
to use the excerpts the plaintiffs refused, but twice offered to
license CBS the use of a compilation they had made. CBS
turned them down, and shortly after Charlie Chaplin's death
aired their own version, 40% of which consisted of the plain-
tiffs' copyrighted films."° The jury found infringement by
CBS, who asked for a judgment not withstanding the verdict,,
or in the alternative, a new trial. The trial judge rejected this
motion.
2. Iowa State
Iowa State University was the owner of the rights to "The
Champion," a fim about wrestler Dan Gable, who went on to
win a gold medal at the 1972 Munich Olympics. The fim was
made by a student, to whom the university gave permission to
license the rights to television. ABC turned down the fim, but
properties of imagery that differentiate it qualitatively from print. . has resulted in
almost monopolistic control over visual materials. Consequently, visual images are far
less accessible than printed materials for discussion and criticism." Lawrence, Copy-
right Law, Fair Use, and the Academy: an Introduction, in FAro USE AND FREE Ir-
QUIRY-CoPYRIGHT LAw AND THE NEW MEDIA 8 (J. Lawrence & B. Timberg eds. 1980:.
For accounts of such litigation, see other essays in FREE INQUIRY: Beltz, Unwriting the
Story of Rock; Lawrence, Donald Duck v. Chilean Socialism: A Fair Use Exchange;
and Lawrence, The Administration of Copyrighted Imagery: Walt Disney Productions.
102. 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
103. 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
104. Quantity. 40% of CBS' compilation was made up of excerpts from Chaplin
films to which the plaintiffs owned the rights. Eleven scenes from five ifims were used:
1 minute 45 seconds from the 1 hour 20 minute film "City Lights"; 3 minutes 45 seconds
from the 1 hour ifim "The Kid"; 1 minute 25 seconds from the 1 hour 12 minute film
"The Circus"; 55 seconds from the 1 hour 29 minute film "Modern Times"; and 1 minute
15 seconds from the 1 hour 12 minute fim "The Gold Rush". 503 F. Supp. at 1145. In all,
9 minutes and 5 seconds were used from a total of 6 hours and 13 minutes of the plain-
tiffs' films, or less than 3%.
Quality. CBS admitted that the scenes it used were among Chaplin's best.
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secretly made a copy and aired segments of the film during its
broadcast of the 1972 Olympics. 105 The university sued, and the
district court found infringement and awarded damages. 10 6 The
verdict was upheld by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.10 7
B. Corporate Theft
A significant innovation in the doctrine of fair use in these
two opinions was the courts' emphasis on "bad faith" conduct
by the defendants. In both cases, negotiations had been held
to secure the rights to the films,108 and there was no question
that the owners expected payment for the use of the films. In
both cases, the defendants made or obtained copies and used
what they wanted, without any payment to the plaintiffs.
In ruling on ABC's defense of fair use, the court in Iowa
State held that since the doctrine is "entirely equitable,"
ABC's conduct was relevant.10 9 "The fair use doctrine is not a
license for corporate theft, empowering a court to ignore a
copyright whenever it determines the underlying work con-
tains material of possible public importance."' 10 In sustaining
the jury's finding of bad faith and the award of punitive dam-
ages, the court in Roy Export cited Iowa State and Time, Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Assoc.: "[f] air use presupposes 'good faith and
fair dealing' ,."
In both cases the defendants' conduct not only showed bad
faith in their dealings with the plaintiffs, but demonstrated a
cynical attitude in their invocation of the fair use defense. By
raising the defense of fair use, they attempted to ennoble their
105. Quantity. ABC admitted broadcasting a total of 2 minutes and 30 seconds of
the plaintiff's film, some of it on three occasions. 621 F.2d at 59. This amounted to
approximately 8%.
Quality. Rejecting ABC's argument that the amount used was insignificant, the
court said that ABC must have "found this footage essential, or at least of some impor-
tance.. ."' Id. at 61.
106. 463 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
107. 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
108. In Iowa State the student offered to license the film to ABC, and in Roy Export
the plaintiffs offered to license their compilation.
109. Id. at 62.
110. Id. at 61.
111. 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The decision in Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis
Assoc. allowed the fair use by the defendant of the copyrighted "Zapruder film" of the
Kennedy assassination. The main factor in favor of the defendant was the "public in-
terest in having the fullest information available on the murder of President Ken-
nedy." Id. at 146. A major factor weighing against the defendant was the subterfuge
involved in obtaining a copy, in defiance of the plaintiff's wishes.
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taking, but their original aims were obvious. CBS claimed that
its use of the Chaplin films was "essential to acquaint the pub-
lic with the artistic genius" of Chaplin, and that "the public
benefit ... outweighed the copyright owner's interest."
112
CBS simply wanted to show their own compilation, rather than
the plaintiffs', without paying for it. Despite ABC's claim that
it was engaged in the "laudable pursuit of disseminating the
life history of an important public figure,"' 13 (wrestler Dan Ga-
ble), they were simply expropriating another's property to use
as "color" for their sports broadcast.
C. Critical Use in Roy Export and Iowa State
The networks did not argue that their use was criticism, but
an analysis of their fair use defenses is useful for two reasons.
First, it illustrates how the "subject of criticism" analysis can
be applied to the use of film clips. Second, the networks' argu-
ment that their use of the plaintiffs' works was for "historical
and biographical" purposes should be examined to distinguish
these purposes from critical ones.
In neither Roy Export nor Iowa State could the networks'
use be considered criticism or comment on the expression in
the original work. ABC and Iowa State had the common pur-
pose of documenting the life of Dan Gable the wrestler. The
subject of the plaintiff's fim was not the film itself, but the sub-
ject of the film. Since the fim was not the subject of ABC's
commentary, ABC had no justification for using the film under
the fair use doctrine.
The Roy Export case is somewhat different. Chaplin's films
could be considered the subject of CBS' use. That use, how-
ever, could not be considered fim criticism, and was commen-
tary of only the most insignificant kind. The actual subject of
CBS' compilation was not Chaplin the performer or film
maker, but Chaplin the recently deceased public figure. CBS
was not criticizing Chaplin's techniques or his films, but his ce-
lebrity. It might be argued that an obituary, in its celebration
of a person's achievements, has the right to use copyrighted
material to show those achievements. The court in Roy Export
acknowledged that "the public interest in Chaplin at the time
112. 503 F. Supp. at 1143-44.
113. 621 F.2d at 60.
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of his death may make the fair use defense relevant."" 4 An
obituary is a critique of sorts, but it is a critique of the person,
and any examination of a person's work is clearly secondary.
The justification for fair use in criticism is that illustration is
essential to criticism." 5 Examples from a person's work are
not essential to a summary of that person's life and achieve-
ments. Consequently, there is less justification in allowing fair
use for this purpose.
What both the networks attempted to establish was that
their use of the films was for "historical and biographical" pur-
poses. They both cited Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random
House, Inc.,"6 which approved of fair use in biographies and
histories of earlier works. This was permitted in Rosemont be-
cause of "the public benefit in encouraging the development of
historical and biographical works and their public
distribution .... " 117
The courts in both Iowa State and Roy Export rejected the
networks' claims of fair use for biographical purposes. The
court in Iowa State said that Rosemont allowed the fair use of
facts from an earlier work, not the expression of those facts:
"[t] he public interest in the free flow of information is assured
by the law's refusal to recognize a valid copyright in facts.""18
Accordingly, the court held that ABC could "claim no need to
'bodily appropriate' Iowa's 'expression"' of biographical
information." 9
In Roy Export, the court rejected the defendant's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and concluded that the
jury could have doubted that the excerpts used from the plain-
tiffs' films were necessary for "proper coverage of Chaplin's
death."' 2 ° The court also refused to find Chaplin's artistic ex-
pressions so newsworthy at the time of his death as to warrant
114. 503 F. Supp. at 1144. The preamble to § 107 cites "news reporting" as a possible
use that could invoke a fair use defense.
115. "The cases put by courts as illustrating what is a fair use are quotations and
extracts for the bona fide and avowed purpose of comment or criticism, or for the pur-
pose of presenting the views of the writer as an authority." Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F.
Cas. 26, 44 (C.C.D. Mass 1869) (No. 8,136).
116. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
117. Id. at 307.
118. 621 F.2d at 61, quoted in Roy Export, 503 F. Supp. at 1144.
119. 621 F.2d at 61.
120. 503 F. Supp. at 1144.
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a finding of fair use by necessity. 121
The extent of the fair user's ability to appropriate the "ex-
pression" of a copyrighted work distinguishes use for criticism
from use for historical or biographical purposes. The Iowa
State court cited Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 22
which said that "[i] n works devoted to historical subjects, it is
our view that a second author may make significant use of
prior work, so long as he does not bodily appropriate the ex..
pression of another.' ' 23 For criticism, on the other hand, courts
have envisioned greater license. Justice Story in Folsom v.
Marsh said that a "reviewer may fairly cite largely from the
original work," 24 and the court in Robert Stigwood Group v.
O'Reilly 2 said that while fair use cannot allow verbatim copy..
ing of a plaintiff's work, "[ilt would seem that critics may quote
extensively in order to comment effectively.' ' 26
VI
Conclusion
Television and film need unrestricted analysis, and that anal.-
ysis requires illustrations and examples from the work ana..
lyzed. Since the Roy Export and Iowa State cases did not
directly deal with the question of fair use of audiovisual mate.-
rial for purposes of criticism, such use is not-foreclosed by the
courts' unwillingness to find fair use. The question remains
open until a case directly addresses the matter. It is possible
that the use of excerpts from audiovisual material for criticism,
like the use of quotations from a book, may become customary
without any litigation on the question at all. It is also possible,
however, that the propensity of movie and television producers
121. Id. CBS contended that "the facts pertinent to the fair use defense were not
seriously in dispute" and asked for a directed verdict. Id. at 1143.
122. 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980).
123. Id. at 980. The Hoehling court expanded somewhat the ambit of the phrase
"historical subjects." The defendant allegedly took from the plaintiff's novel on the
Hindenberg zepplin disaster the theory that a person who had actually been on the
final flight of the Hindenberg might have sabotaged it. The court found no copyright in
the plaintiff's historical interpretation and held that "broad latitude must be granted to
subsequent authors who make use of historical subject matter, including theories or
plots." Id. at 978.
124. 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (1841).
125. 346 F. Supp. 376 (D.C. Conn. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 530 F.2d 1096, cent
denied, 429 U.S. 848.
126. Id. at 385.
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to sue 127 will work a chilling effect on critics, preventing the
sort of criticism helpful to the public and the audiovisual arts.
The visual arts, with their direct linkage of subject and ex-
pression, present problems different from the other arts. The
single visual image cannot readily be excerpted in criticism
without great danger of exploiting the value of the entire work.
The linkage of the subject and the expression is loosened in
audiovisual works by the presence of time as part of the
expression.
For fair use purposes, films and video works should be
treated as if they were books, allowing the examples necessary
for fair criticism and comment. The same limitations would
apply to each, to insure that the criticism does not supplant the
work criticized. Since there exists the very real danger of ex-
ploiting the most valuable parts of an audiovisual work, courts
and counsel should be vigilant not only of the motives of the
user, but the nature of the use. The subject of the criticism
should be the art in the work-it should focus on the expres-
sion, not the subject, of the work criticized. That is the purpose
of criticism, to judge "the qualities and values of the aesthetic
object."'28 That is the justification for fair use.
127. See note 101, supra.
128. See note 41 and accompanying text, supra.
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